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DRAFT VERSION: THE POETICS OF REMOTENESS 
 
 
Marc Botha  
 
1. A fragile encounter 
 
The sandstone formations of the Rooiberge glow a deepening ochre at sunset. In these foothills of the 
mighty Drakensberg mountains which bisect the South African landscape, the rocks momentarily 
pulsate red before the sun gives them over fully to darkness. So intense is this moment that colour 
becomes rhythm; form becomes pure density. These rocks themselves seem to be the source of a 
synaesthetic poiesis: they draw something new and indeterminate from the interplay of the classical 
elements of earth and fire. A generative echo seems to radiate  from their sandstone surfaces – 
perhaps of the nearby sources of the Tugela and Orange rivers, the two great arteries which spring 
from the mountains and cut through forest and desert, surging towards the Indian Ocean in the east 
and the Atlantic Ocean in the west.  
 
On the other hand, there can be no doubt that this red glow is the most banal thing: it is simply a 
physical phenomenon, one which happens almost daily. That the play of light and mineral should be 
so overwhelming, points not to the phenomenon itself, but to its apprehension by the senses.  The 
evanescent moment at which sensory information and the sensory apparatus coincide to make a 
poem of sun and rock reflects a deeply human capacity – the capacity to generate sense, to make 
sense. The work of Jean-Luc Nancy is particularly useful in coming to terms with the relationship 
between the poem and sense. For Nancy, the poem never fully makes sense; it indicates an access to 
sense, but cannot provide this access:1 “it has the sense of an access to a sense that is each time 
absent...a sense that is always still to be made.”2  
 
Sense, for Nancy, is a complex yet agile concept. It weaves together the sensible nature of things, the 
fact that sense and sensation are embodied, and the processes involved in making sense. But sense 
also indicates an originary excess or multiplicity, which is why Nancy conceived of this complex fabric 
of sense as indicative of the immanence of being itself – “the structure of sense qua sense of the 
                                                          
1 No “kind of poetry constitutes a means or medium of acces,” but at the same time “poetry cannot be defined 
except by such access, and...poetry occurs only when such access occurs” (Jean-Luc Nancy, “Making Poetry,” 
Multiple Arts: The Muses II, trans. Leslie Hill (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2006), 3. 
2 Ibid., 4. 
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world.”3 The poem – “whether...a piece of writing or a natural object,”4 a question of process, or a 
moment of intense sensation – is understood in its broadest sense as a particular manifestation of the 
force of poiesis, generation, or production. In its generative aspect, the poem offers a point of contact 
between the sense of things and the sense of the world, between particular entities and being in 
general.  
 
However, such contact should not be misconstrued as a constant point of access to the ontological 
sense of the world as such, and thus as an illustration, explanation, or justification for particular 
ontological situations. To claim the latter would be to wield, through the poem, a metonymic force 
capable of uncritically supplanting those things which exist neutrally, without belonging to a particular 
configuration of sense – what Andrew Gibson terms the remainder5 – with a type of creative 
totalitarianism.  Returning to the reflected glow of the setting sun, the poetic essence of this moment 
is not some sort of sublime access to the transcendental truth of being, but points precisely to the fact 
that the poem is a singular and tentative point of contact between matter and sense. The poem is a 
fragile event – the briefest presence amidst the “chaotic sensibility”6 of existence. As the sun vanishes, 
the cliffs of the Rooiberge momentarily pulsate with an aesthetic potentiality which belongs not to 
the stones and the sun, not the beholder, the poet, or the painter, but to the sense of being itself.  
 
The fragility and transience of the poetic moment is what establishes the singularity of the poem. As 
Attridge recognizes, such singularity does not designate an essence,7 but rather an “event of 
                                                          
3 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense of the World, trans. Jeffrey S. Librett (Minneapolis and London: U of Minnesota P, 
1993), 3.  
4 Nancy, “Making Poetry,” 3. 
5 What Gibson refers to as the remainder, characterizes those things which are irreducible to a specific event or 
sequence of sense, indicating the situations in which “inertia commonly prevails and is the rule. Not only must 
events leave a historical remainder; since events are rare, the remainder must comprise the larger part of 
historical experience” (Andrew Gibson, Intermittency: The Concept of Historical Reason in Recent French 
Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP,  2012), 82.  
6 Alain Badiou, “The Subject of Art,” The Symptom: Online Journal for Lacan.com 6 (2005), 
<http://www.lacan.com/symptom6_articles/badiou.html>. 14 March 2013. 
7 Derek Attridge, The Singularity of Literature (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 67. While the present 
argument concurs with the insight that singularity is an event, it does not wholly agree with the assertion that 
this event “takes place in reception” and that “it does not occur outside the responses of those who encounter 
and thereby constitute it” (ibid.). For Attridge, reception is effectively a distribution of sense between writer, 
reader, text, and context (an argument which holds when generalized from the literary to other creative 
contexts), a view which finally identifies the work as a form of expression, and so is retraceable through various 
hermeneutic processes. Although less common, there are autopoietic and process-oriented sonic, visual and 
literary works which are driven by a similar degree of contingency, but a contingency which is not primarily 
dependent on human perception or reception (Alvin Lucier’s I Am Sitting in a Room and Michael Sailstorfer’s 
Forst are good examples). 
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singularizing”8 and the process of the “real-time unfolding”9 of the poetic work. The singular intensity 
of the poetic moment emerges only when, however briefly, poiesis itself – ordinarily inaccessible, 
impossibly remote – is brought into contact with the poem as immanent and concrete occurrence. 
However, as Nancy notes, this “occurs each and every time only once, and it has always to be done 
again”.10 The vocation of the poem resides in a singularity which is at once both self-sufficient and 
dependent on reiteration, since it indicates a “making [which is] each time an original act.”11  
 
The result is that the poem, “the thing made,”12 always demands reiteration, not because it is 
incomplete but, on the contrary, because it is complete, “finished, finite.”13 The poetic moment is one 
of potentially infinite repetitions of the “perfect actuality of infinite sense,”14 which, for Nancy, is the 
closest the poem comes to an identity as such. Every sunset contains the potentiality of the poem, but 
whether or not it achieves its singular, transient coherence, it remains entirely contingent. Radical 
poetic work must occur with each performance if the poem is consistently to make poetic sense. As 
Giorgio Agamben perceptively recognizes, there must be every chance that a particular occurrence 
not take place in order for its potential to remain charged in relation to the future.15 The poem must 
remain a radically contingent phenomenon for the singularity of its reiteration to bridge the distance 
between the uncharged remainder and the discharged detritus16 of the everyday on the one hand, 
and the charged but remote force of poiesis on the other.  
 
 
2. Poetry from and against the void 
 
The specific location to which the opening refers, is reached by a fairly long and difficult ascent, criss-
crossing a mountain stream which winds its way through dense but passable groves of thorn trees. 
Passing a series of small waterfalls and pools, it is necessary to traverse a large cavern – at least twenty 
metres across and ten metres deep, its ceiling tapering from some ten metres at its opening, to two 
                                                          
8 Ibid., 64. 
9 Ibid., 71. 
10 Nancy, “Making Poetry,” 6. This claim might be instructively elaborated by comparing it to Heidegger’s 
displacement of poetic work from mimetic particularity to singular essence (Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of 
the Work of Art,” Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Alfred Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 37. 
11 Nancy, “Making Poetry,” 7.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Giorgio Agamben, “On Potentiality,” Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999), 182-3. 
16 See Gibson, Intermittency, 37. 
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metres at its rear – to reach a long, narrow plateau. This plateau comes to a sudden halt, and drops 
into a wide gorge, on the opposite side of which is a massive cave-dotted cliff, a cliff which radiates its 
own singular golden poetry at dusk.   
 
There is something profoundly fragile in this landscape. Its spectacularly radiant sandstone fades to 
darkness almost too quickly for the poem to be recognized as such. This is a landscape more 
susceptible than most to erosion and to a progressive dissolution of the very substance which seems 
to harbour such poetic potential. Yet, in a significant sense, the negation of this material coherence 
suggests the dialectic structure of poiesis itself. The forces of compaction and torsion which determine 
the densities of different strata of rock, positing form by actively shaping the planet, are the same 
forces which make erosion and subsequent dissolution of these forms not only possible, but 
inevitable. Erosion indicates a growing absence of form which symmetrically negates the emergence 
of form. Simultaneously, however, the caverns and caves which certain types of erosion make 
possible, constitute new fields of potentiality, empty but habitable spaces which have proven crucial 
to the evolution and survival of numerous organic species.  
 
These superficially antithetical forces, which together produce the physical poiesis of a world, recall 
Friedrich Schlegel’s contention that the poem is “continuously fluctuating between self-destruction 
and self-creation.”17 That Schlegel’s ideal poem is an autopoietic fragment which exists in absolute 
isolation, should be understood not as an attempt to dissociate poetry from the world as such, but 
rather as an attempt to distil the essence of poiesis.18 At the heart of this enterprise is the conviction 
that the forces which shape the poem and the world are co-extensive. This assertion can be traced 
from the project of the Jena Romantics to the later work of Heidegger which, amplified by ecocritics 
like Jonathan Bate, proposes “a special kind of writing, called poetry, which has the peculiar power to 
speak ‘earth’.”19 For Heidegger, in other words, as for the Jena Romantics, poiesis refers to a 
foundational, generative force;20a force capable of producing a world.  
 
                                                          
17 Friedrich Schlegel, “Athenaeum Fragment 51,” Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, ed. J.M. Bernstein 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP), 247. 
18 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German 
Romanticism, trans. Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester (Albany: State U of New York P, 1988), 11-2. 
19 Jonathan Bate, The Song of the Earth (Basingstoke and Oxford: Picador, 2000), 251. 
20 Martin Heidegger, “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,” Elucidation of Hölderlin’s Poetry, trans. Keith Hoeller 
(Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2000), 60-3. 
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Emphasizing the Heidegerrian distinction between world and earth, Bate contends that the production 
of a suitably hospitable world is precisely what is at stake in a contemporary ecopoetics. 21 Heidegger’s 
distinction between world and earth proves instructive. World refers to the singularly human capacity 
to express our situatedness in language: “[o]nly where there is language, is there world, that is, the 
constantly changing cycle of decision and work, of action and responsibility, but also of arbitrariness 
and turmoil, decay and confusion.”22 Earth, by contrast, describes those things which exist 
indifferently, which have not yet been unconcealed by language, given particular valences or 
purposes, and redefined as part of a world. Poetry radicalizes the linguistic “task of making beings 
manifest.”23  The poem is foundational: it speaks “the essential word…[revealing] things as what they 
are,”24 generating the conditions under which the essence of being is immanent to the senses and the 
intellect. Poetic essence obviates the need for distinguishing world from earth, uncovering from 
concealment, since in poetry existence is revealed in its nakedness.  
 
If poetry “sings the song of the earth,”25 as Bate contends, it does so not by hymning the “essential 
nearness of things”26 – a nearness which, insofar as it remains implicitly anchored to the Heidegerrian 
notion of dwelling within a world, habitually reflects what Kate Rigby recognizes as “the inescapability 
of anthropocentrism.”27 Rather, might it not be possible to recognize in poetry a different music – not 
a song, which in any event is so intimately connected to the human voice, but a different patterning 
of the undifferentiated noise from which being is drawn?28 Such a poetry might clarify Heidegger’s 
claim regarding the ambiguity of “poetry as a founding [gesture].”29 For, while adamant that “[w]e 
never find the ground [of being] in the abyss,”30 he is also convinced that the poem is able to ground 
being only because the poet “holds firm in the Nothingness.”31 In other words, poiesis grounds being 
because its generativity exposes itself as a relation to the void. Poetry only manifests a world ex nihilo 
to the extent that it exists contra nihilo – against the void – as the point of minimal contact between 
nothingness and that which exists. This singular point, at which the essence of poiesis is expressed in 
                                                          
21 Bate, Song, 245. 
22  Heidegger, “Hölderlin,” 56.  
23 Ibid., 55. 
24 Ibid., 59. 
25 Bate, Song, 251 
26 Heidegger, “Hölderlin,” 59. 
27 Kate Rigby, “Earth, World, Text: On the (Im)possibility of Ecopoiesis,” New Literary History, 35 (2): 438. 
28 In this regard, Michel Serres notes that “[b]ackground noise may well be the ground of our being… 
The background noise never ceases; it is limitless, continuous, unending, unchanging. It has itself no background, 
no contradictory” (Michel Serres, Genesis , trans. Geneviève James and James Nielson (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan 
P, 1995), 13. 
29 Ibid., 60. 
30 Heidegger, “Hölderlin,” 59. 
31 Ibid., 65. 
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terms of a minimal poetry of essences, approximates nothingness while simultaneously resisting the 
pure impotentiality to which Heidegger alludes when he recognizes that “the nothing itself 
nihilates.”32   
 
3. Patterning a different cosmos 
 
In this way, the poem offers itself in oblique testimony to the radical, productive tension which prevails 
between existence and non-existence.33 In the midst of this tension, the truth of existence appears to 
be nothing other than facticity at its most simple: poetry “brings about the truth vicariously”34because 
it generates a world in the radical manner of its testimony to the facticity of existence, and to the 
facticity of singular patterns within this existence. The primary intuition of poetry is that something 
exists rather than nothing,35 and it is this confrontation of being with non-being36 which promises a 
poiesis liberated from its historically anthropocentric moorings.  
 
Directed towards a more encompassing understanding of oikos or dwelling, a contemporary 
ecopoetics promises to revise its understanding of the world-making capacity of the poem in a manner 
which moves beyond the Heideggerian segregation of world from earth. This recognition informs both 
Timothy Morton’s reconsideration of ecology in terms of a  “mesh without center or edge,”37 and Mick 
Smith’s deployment of the term epharmosis to describe the “co-appearance in/as the world”38 a 
provisional community composed of entities,39 constitutively open to constant change, and often 
“with little or nothing in common.”40 
 
A critical reassessment of the relation between poiesis and world calls into question not only the 
implicit anthropocentrism of understanding the world as oikos or dwelling-place, but also the vitalist 
                                                          
32 Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?,” Basic Writings: Nine Essays, plus, the Introduction of Being and 
Time,” ed. and trans. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1978), 103. It is worth mentioning that Nancy’s 
phrase, “nothing …growing as something” (Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World, or Globalization, trans. 
Francois Raffoul and David Pettigrew (Albany, State U of New York P, 2007), 51), which is discussed below, might 
be viewed as an interpretation of this, amongst Heidegger’s most cryptic phrases, “the nothing itself nihilates.” 
33 See Agamben, “On Potentiality,” 179-182. 
34 Heidegger, “Hölderlin,” 65. 
35 Agamben, “On Potentiality,” 183. 
36 See Mick Smith, Against Ecological Sovereignty: Ethics, Biopolitics, and Saving the Natural World (Minneapolis 
and London: U of Minnesota P, 2011), 209-10.  
37 Timothy Morton, “Coexistence and Coexistents: Ecology without a World,” Ecocritical Theory: New European 
Approaches, ed. Axel Goodbody and Kate Rigby (Charlottesville and London: U of Virginia P, 2011), 169 (168-80).   
38 Mick Smith, “Epharmosis: Jean-Luc Nancy and the Political Oecology of Creation,” Environmental Ethics, 32.4 
(2010): 403. 
39 Such elements might include animate and inanimate entities, but, equally, more abstract entities, physical 
phenomena and processes. 
40 Ibid. 
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or biocentric models of the world as an autopoietic, living entity.41 The poetic generation of a world 
undoubtedly involves an ongoing interaction between a variable number of entities and processes, in 
which case every judgement as to the nature or state of the world is merely provisional. The world is 
liable to expand in unexpected ways, and to be acted upon by forces radically external to it. 
Consequently, to present the world as a place proves inadequate. Instead, it becomes necessary to 
imagine a different sort of world: a world which is not defined as a proper place; a world which is 
immanent yet cannot be reduced to presence; a world which is thoroughly materialist yet not limited 
by physical matter; a world of contingent coherence yet which cannot be grasped in terms of unity, 
no matter how contingently or fleetingly.  
 
The present argument holds that any conception of the world as limited to or by topoi and topology – 
a conviction common to most species of anthropocentrism, biocentrism, ecocentrism and 
geocentrism – is insufficient to the task of coming to grips with poiesis as a truly radical world-making 
force. Finally, poiesis describes not only the production of new entities and new relations between 
entities, but also the force from which the possibility of entities and relations is drawn in the first 
place. At its most radical, poiesis is encountered as potentiality itself.  What, then, of the poem as an 
entity, and specifically as an entity which habitually makes reference to specific places, or which is 
inextricable from its physical location, as in the case of Schaaplaats? How might our understanding of 
what constitutes a world mediate between the potentiality of poiesis and the actuality of the poem, 
and, conversely, how might the relation between poiesis and poem assist us in understanding the 
world? 
 
The geophilosophy of Deleuze and Guatarri addresses precisely this problem when, interrogating the 
relationship between transcendental concept and immanent figure, the philosophers identify the sort 
of encounter42 capable of mediating between the two: “[t]hinking…implies a projection of the 
transcendent on the plane of immanence.”43 Poetic thinking, then, acts to instantiate a sort of 
poiessence44 – a situation in which the transcendental potentiality of poetry as generative force and 
the immanence of the instantiated poem encounter one another in the world-making activity of 
poiesis. It is clear that a poetics adequate to this demanding task must exceed the ecopoetics which 
                                                          
41 Smith’s criticism of this view is concise and persuasive (Against Ecological Sovereignty, 195-8). 
42 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guatarri, What Is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchill (London 
and New York: Verso, 1994), 93. 
43 Ibid., 89. 
44 As a conjunction of poiesis and essence, the term poiessence is offered here to address the force of generativity 
simultaneously in its radical and anarchic dimensions; a force which is at once processual and substantial, and 
descriptive of the manner in which a new entity comes into being out of and against non-existence, and, arising 
thus, also coming to itself as the poem at its most minimal and at its most autonomous. 
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Bate identifies in his engagement with Heidegger. Yet to imagine as the predicate of poiesis, a world 
entirely devoid of notions of oikos and topos, of dwelling and of place, is to abandon the notion of 
world entirely. The challenge which confronts a contemporary reassessment of poiesis is henceforth 
one of extending the poetic configuration of a world to one which is simultaneously atopian and 
immanent, contingently stable yet constitutively incomplete. The manifestation of poiesis at its most 
radical – the poem, at once proximate to yet remote from the void; without a proper place, yet 
productive of a world which exceeds the grasp of ecocritical and geocritical topologies – demands the 
formulation of a cosmopoetics.  
 
Cosmos, as conceived in the present work, constitutes a generic space within which every possible 
world exists. In one sense, such a cosmos is atopian – it does not constitute a proper or stable place 
as such – but for this very reason it is also universal – it belongs to every possible entity, to every 
possible world, as the generic field of their compossibility.45 A cosmos is a world made of making: 
responsive, adaptive and generative; irreducibly multiple, open, subject to expansion and contraction; 
contingent and provisional, yet not without definition or stability. In a passage to which Smith draws 
careful attention,46 Nancy argues that such a cosmos – a world made of making, or created of creating 
– is “created from nothing;”47 not in the sense that it suddenly emerges from the void, but in the sense 
that creation as a force, reveals itself to be “nothing …growing as something.”48 This force of world-
making, which Nancy conceives in terms of a negative autopoeisis49 and Smith in terms of 
epharmosis,50 corresponds loosely to what is intended in the present piece by radical poiesis which, 
being drawn from and against the void, instantiates at an ephemeral but charged point, the force of 
generation ex nihilo and the poem which is generated.51 
 
In this light, the poem, which Nancy defines precisely as “the thing made of making itself,”52 is the 
contingent localization of a pattern within the unpatterned cosmos. Cosmopoetics, defined minimally, 
thus describes the poetic patterning of the world qua cosmos, and the poetry of a cosmopoetics takes 
on the auto-generative task of presenting the world from which it simultaneously emerges. As 
                                                          
45 Compossibility describes the situation in which apparent contradictories are able to co-exist without 
eliminating their distinctiveness, and is taken up in greater detail below. 
46 See Smith, Against Ecological Sovereignty, 211-214. 
47 Nancy, Creation, 51.  
48 Ibid. 
49 “In creation, a growth grows from nothing and this nothing takes care of itself, cultivates its growth” (ibid). 
50 Smith, “Epharmosis,” 404. 
51 In this sense, the poem instantiates that to which Nancy refers when he claims that “the ex nihilo is the genuine 
formulation of a radical materialism that is to say, precisely without roots” (ibid). See Nancy, Creation, 59; Smith, 
Against Ecological Sovereignty, 213-4. 
52 Nancy, “Making Poetry,” 8  
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envisioned here, cosmopoetics is the aesthetic elaboration of the cosmopolitics which Isabelle 
Stengers develops, and which Bruno Latour describes as combining the “strongest meaning of cosmos 
and the strongest meaning of politics”53: 
 
[T]he strength of one element checks any dulling in the strength of the other. The presence of 
cosmos in cosmopolitics resists the tendency of politics to mean the give-and-take in an 
exclusive human club. The presence of politics in cosmopolitics resists the tendency of cosmos 
to mean a ﬁnite list of entities that must be taken into account. Cosmos protects against the 
premature closure of politics, and politics against the premature closure of cosmos.54 
 
Might similar checks apply to a cosmopoetics? In this case, the cosmos in cosmopoetics would resist 
any tendency of the poem towards absolute aesthetic self-containment or an eschewal of the material 
reality which precedes its advent.55 The corollary is that the poetics in cosmopoetics would resist the 
reduction of the cosmos to a static position precisely to the extent that poiesis describes a field of 
radical potentiality and generativity capable of maintaining itself in an openness to novelty. 
Cosmopoetics describes the structures and patterns of a poetic world-in-formation, as well as the form 
of a worldly poetry. 
 
 
4. Poem and pattern 
 
If this is indeed the case, then the effectiveness of poetry is as much derived from these forces of 
formation, of making and unmaking, as it is from the media and forms through which poetic 
experience is communicated. Beyond analogy or homology, beyond seeming and structure, it is the 
productive force of structuration – of positing structure from and against the void – which allows us 
to recognize sonnets and sunsets as equally reflective of poiesis. To approach the poem in terms of 
structuration rather than structure, force rather than form, reveals that the essence of poiesis might 
best be described as the force which transforms potentiality into pattern. Poiesis is a force of 
patterning, and, finally, poetic patterning simply means to “posit within being”56 – to posit a 
                                                          
53 Bruno Latour, “Whose Cosmos, Which Cosmopolitics? Comments on the Peace Terms of Ulrich Beck”, 
Common Knowledge, 10.3 (2004): 454. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Such would undoubtedly be the case in a poetry constituted solely of what is described above in terms of 
poiessences. 
56 Nancy, “Making Poetry,” 7.  
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contingent pattern against the nothingness which grounds being, against the absolute absence proper 
solely to the void.  
  
The void emerges thus as a structural principle57 rather than as a metaphysical construct. Heidegger 
affirms this with respect to the work of the potter – and we may safely substitute poet here – who 
“takes hold of the impalpable void and brings it forth as the container [or poem],”58 but without 
negating that it is the “emptiness, the void, [which] is what does the [poem’s] holding.”59 This 
recognition regarding structuration lies at the heart of Badiou’s claim that the void is a point of access 
to being itself 60 which, of necessity, cannot itself be presented – “an unpresentable access, thus non-
access, to this access [to being].”61 The void names the unpresentable part of every presentation,62 
and the poem – in the sense that it constitutes a process of patterning, the presentation of something 
rather than nothing63 – draws itself from the radical absence of the void.  
 
The resonance with Nancy’s claim that poetry is “the negativity by which access [to the sense of the 
world, or being itself] makes itself what it is,”64 is noteworthy. “Access is difficult,” Nancy continues, 
and “[s]omething that is difficult is something that resists our efforts to make something of it, and this 
is properly what makes poetry occur.”65 Indeed, in examining Nancy’s contention that it is radical 
nothingness or the void which conditions the very possibility of materialism,66 Smith maintains that 
“the world is created…through the constitutive acts of those singularities…[which] together, compose 
it, ex nihilo, from and in the face of ‘nothing’.”67 In this light, the generative tension which defines the 
relation between poem, structure and void might be set out as follows: poiesis is the force of 
                                                          
57 Very briefly, Badiou suggests that the void constitutes the principle of structuration which is necessary to 
every structure, or, in the set theoretical terms which define elements in terms of inclusion and exclusion, the 
empty set which defines the possibility of a set, but is not itself an element of any set. See Alain Badiou, Being 
and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London and New York: Continuum, 2005), 93-4. 
58 Martin Heidegger, “The Thing,” Poetry, Language, Thought, 169. 
59 Ibid. 
60 The void, according to Badiou is “the name of being” (Badiou, Being and Event, 56), in which case being might 
be defined as “multiplicity plucked from the void” (Alain Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy, trans. Louise 
Burchill (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity, 2011), 29).  
61 Badiou, Being and Event, 56. 
62 Ibid., 55-8. 
63 Here it is necessary to recall Lyotard’s suggestion that the sublime involves the radical anxiety which 
accompanies “[t]he possibility of nothing happening,” (Jean-Francois Lyotard, “The Sublime and the Avant-
Garde”, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Cambridge: Polity, 
1991), 92), a possibility which manifests in a radical existential doubt – and which poses itself in terms of the 
sublime uncertainty of the question “[i]s it happening?...[T]he mark of the question is ‘now,’ now like the feeling 
that nothing might happen: the nothingness now” (ibid.).  
64 Nancy, “Making Poetry,” 4. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Nancy, Creation, 59; Smith, Against Ecological Sovereignty, 244. 
67 Ibid., 213. 
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patterning which presents a positive approximation of structuration; structuration, as the generative 
response to our encounter with the radix of sense, is the force which actualizes non-access to the 
void,68 and thus – in what is only an apparent paradox – provides access to non-presentation. This 
coincidence of access and non-access is precisely what is at stake in the immanence of poetic 
experience, and in the recognition that the poem is a fragile thing, “the thing made from making 
itself.”69  As such, the poem is an exemplary instantiation of the force of poiesis – a singular pattern of 
the processes of patterning which offers a minimal point of contact with the void.  
 
There is nothing in poetry qua poetry which offers predictable access to the void, to the radix of sense. 
The void is radically remote – inseparable from being, yet inaccessible in itself. At most, it can be 
weakly and obliquely intuited by the manner in which the poem instantiates the generative force of 
poiesis, a poiesis which itself offers only a minimal point of contact with the void. Remoteness 
describes every type of relationship with the void. As Heidegger recognizes, remoteness is neither a 
lack of proximity nor a spatial distance, but reflects an original severance between the void and 
being.70 To approximate remoteness is impossible, but to retain a comportment or directionality with 
respect to that which is remote or severed from being – the void – is essential to the presentation of 
every object.71 Remoteness is the necessary condition for the void to be recognized but not actualized, 
generating what might be intuited as a general existential momentum so that “bringing-close or de-
severance is always a kind of concernful Being towards what is brought close and de-severed.”72  
 
With respect to the void, remoteness reveals both an indelible distance and an “essential tendency 
towards closeness.”73 The singular force of the poem resides in its capacity simultaneously to reflect 
oblique contact and barred access to the void. Poetic language reveals a double aperture to being 
itself: the first is the ontopoetic genesis of being, drawn from and against the void; the second is the 
ecopoetics of dwelling which, as Bate recognizes, indicates “either (both?) a language…that restores 
us to our home (oikos) or (and?) a melancholy recognizing that our only home (oikos) is language.”74 
Rigby defines the poem in its Heideggerian register as that which “lets things be in their obscure 
                                                          
68 There is no simple transit between the void and existence. For something which exists to be in direct contact 
with the void – we might say, for it to gain full access to the void as such – would mean its annihilation. Hence it 
is only through a minimal quasi-access – which Nancy terms a non-access – that existence can be said to draw 
itself from the void, obtaining structure with respect to that which cannot be structured. 
69 Ibid., 8.  
70 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), 
138-44. 
71 Ibid., 143. 
72 Ibid., 140. 
73 Ibid.  
74 Bate, Song, 281. 
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otherness in the very process of revealing them.”75 Poetic presence emerges in the shadow of the void 
upon a tense threshold of immanence and absence. It is from this tension that the existential 
momentum of poetry is derived, posited as it is at the threshold upon which pattern and patterning, 
poem and poiesis, are commensurate. In this specific sense, I suggest that poetics might be defined as 
the invention and exploration of the empty forms from which poetic momentum arises, and which 
condition the possibility that the poem may be posited as a minimal and evanescent point of contact 
with the void, or the ground of being.  
 
 
5. A Hermeneutic of the Void 
 
If the sublime intensity of the ochre rocks at sunset seem at first to be the locus of a poetic experience 
of this landscape – the foothills of the Rooiberge at Schaaplaats – it is in fact the empty space beneath 
the rock outcrop – the space through which it is necessary to pass to the plateau and the vista of the 
glowing cliffs – which contains the clearest glimpse of the remote essence of poiesis, and the fragility 
of the poem through which this essence is posited. For, on the rear wall of this cavern (Figure 1) is 
painted a remarkable anthology of San visual poetry – generations of figures, images and symbols 
which testify to the inhabitation of this region by semi-nomadic groups for many hundreds of years.  
  
Historically, anthropologists, historians and writers have used the term Khoisan as a generic name for 
the earliest indigenous inhabitants of Southern Africa. In fact, the term not only fuses two distinct 
cultural groups – the pastoral Khoi Khoi, whose sedentary pattern of settlement is opposed to the 
nomadism of the hunter-gatherer San – but it also explicitly reduces to a notion of group, tribe, people 
or nation, that which is, in fact, a far more complex pattern of belonging and identification. 
Consequently, San culture has habitually been reduced to the terms most amenable to post-
Enlightenment thought. Most often, this takes the form of a terrifying dehumanization. At other times, 
the San are forced into a mythical, prelapsarian pastoral narrative, the heroes of an imaginary idyll 
which, at its most benign, echoes Diderot’s Supplement to Bougainville’s Voyage. Even a thinker as 
subtle as Bataille betrays the distinctly imperialist provenance of his thought when he attempts to 
identify the “germinal essence of the work of art”76 as the event by which humanity separates itself 
                                                          
75 Rigby, Earth, World, Text, 430. 
76 Georges Bataille, Lascaux, or The Birth of Art, trans. Austryn Wainhouse (Geneva: Skira, 1955), 12. 
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decisively from the spectre of its animality.77 Despite hesitating before “the risky term primitive,”78 
Bataille’s accession to an implicitly progressivist vision of history, to his mind, justifies generalizing to 
the “modern ‘primitive’…a level of material civilization [which] does indeed border on [that of the] 
true primitive[…].”79  
 
Significantly, this comparison is advanced not on the basis of aesthetic, thematic or even contextual 
similarities, but on similarities which proceed from the stratification of value in terms of levels – the 
tiers of a normative hierarchy the foundation of which is nowhere justified or explained. It is 
unfortunate but unavoidable that this failure casts a considerable shadow over what, as Mick Smith’s 
critique of ecological sovereignty similarly recognizes, is an otherwise compelling account of radical 
poiesis in rock art as a transgressive and traumatic encounter with finitude and the void which 
manifests the aesthetic “game of birth and death played on stone.”80 When Bataille subsequently 
rejects the comparison, it is not on the basis of its alarming insensitivity to cultural difference or 
historical contingency, but because Bataille fears that “if modelled after today’s retarded primitives, 
our idea of Lascaux Man will be faulty.”81 
 
Unfortunately, similar claims are not unusual in many studies of rock, and nowhere are these more 
pronounced than in many of the colonial accounts of San rock art. In such studies the San are often 
misrepresented as a “helpless, simple folk who loved dancing and used their leisure in the unhurried 
production of ‘art’.”82 Seen as a bothersome but generally benign group, scattered yet culturally 
homogeneous, it became commonplace simply to ignore the nuanced interrelationship of San politics, 
religion, ecology and aesthetics. So unfamiliar is the normative western frame with this word-view, 
that the San are habitually mistaken for an anarchic society prone to being utterly overwhelmed and 
                                                          
77 According to Bataille, it is not the invention and manipulation of tools, nor the concomitant transformation of 
the improvised responses dictated by necessity into the strategic labour of work, which mark the final step 
beyond our animality to being fully human. If existing “under the sign of work and tool-making” (ibid., 27) marks 
the first of “two capital events in the course of human history” (ibid), it is the second – the “making of art-
objects” (ibid) which marks the “shift from the world of work to the world of play…from the roughhewn to the 
finished individual being” (ibid). For Bataille, it is the capacity to make without specific purpose which reflects 
the singularly human dimension of poiesis (ibid., 15, 25-6).  
78 Ibid., 25. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., 38. 
81 Ibid., 25. 
82 David Lewis-Williams, Discovering Southern African Rock Art (Cape Town and Johannesburg: David Philip, 
1990), 19. It is worth asking to what extent Bataille’s view of art, as a species of ritual play that is antithetical to 
the instrumental functionalism of work, might tacitly fuel this sort of interpretation. See Bataille, Lascaux, 35-8. 
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easily displaced by stronger groups, leaving only the most rudimentary trace of their inhabitation in 
the form of engravings and rock paintings at sites such as Schaaplaats. 
   
Although such blatantly racist versions of San history are now defunct, and a considerable amount of 
archeological, anthropological and historical work is underway to rethink San culture, there still exists 
some disagreement as to whether such sites as Schaaplaats served primarily domestic or ritual 
purposes, or, perhaps, a combination of the two.83 Inextricable from this distinction, is the substantial 
division regarding how best to analyse and understand this work. The foremost proponent of a 
cognitive hermeneutic approach to the study of these sites, David Lewis-Williams, criticizes the 
dominant practices of interpreting San rock art either as an exclusively aesthetic practice – limiting 
commentary to the description of decorative style and visual effect84 – or as a mimetic narrative of 
the everyday.85 Instead, Lewis-Williams suggest that the comprehension of San rock art depends on 
the recognition that these works are the poetic transcription of trance phenomena with a 
neuropsychological, and hence ubiquitous, basis.86  
 
San beliefs express an essential continuity between spirituality and materiality,87 a radical alternative 
to the rift between the sacred and the profane which haunts western thought and experience. Thus 
there exist no substantial conceptual barriers to the tiered cosmology of the San, its emphasis on the 
exchange of energy or potency between the different levels, or its assertion that it is the “intermediate 
level on which human beings live and on which the lower and upper levels impinge in various ways,”88 
inhabited as they are by entities of a different, yet no less real, substance. By harnessing the vital 
energy or potency which moves between the physical and insubstantial states of matter, the altered 
consciousness associated with ritual activity is viewed as a means of controlling traffic between these 
levels in order to heal, ward off illness, and manipulate the elements.89  
                                                          
83 David Lewis-Williams, “Constructing a Cosmos: Architecture, power and domestication at Çatalhöyük,” Journal 
of Social Archeology 4:1 (2004): 32. 
84 Lewis-Williams, Discovering, 20-1. 
85 Ibid., 22, 25; David Lewis-Williams, Reality and Non-Reality in San Rock Art (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand 
University Press, 1988), 1-2. 
86 “From neuropsychological research we know that San shamans would have experienced geometric entoptic 
phenomena because the nervous system is a human universal, and it automatically produces these forms in 
certain altered states” (ibid., 5). Lewis-Williams emphasizes, however, that the San “seldom use hallucinogens; 
they enter trance by hyperventilation, rhythmic movement and music, and intense concentration” (ibid., 3). 
Although “[t]aking hallucinogens is the most obvious way of seeing entoptic phenomena…they are also induced 
by rhythmic dancing and music, sensory deprivation, hyperventilation, prolonged and intense concentration, 
and, as many people know from experience, by migraine” (Lewis-Williams, Discovering, 56). 
87 Lewis-Williams, “Constructing a Cosmos,” 41.  
88 Ibid., 30. 
89 See Lewis-Williams, Reality and Non-Reality, 7.  
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Untangling the semiotic knots with which the modern hermeneut of rock art is confronted, is 
admittedly no easy task. In this respect, Bataille’s rather speculative analysis is better read in 
counterpoint, rather than in opposition, to the cognitive archaeological approach which informs 
Lewis-Williams’ work. For Bataille, art is the cipher for an ontological radicalism: “it transfixes 
us…[making] present…all that is most remote”90 –  namely the very origin of our self-awareness of the 
way in which we are human, that “clear and burning presence”91 which manifests in terms of the 
“creat[ion] out of nothing [by] which communication between individual minds begins.”92 For Bataille, 
art instantiates that which for Lewis-Williams it merely reflects. In this light, Lewis-Williams offers a 
far more modest proposal: rock art offers a visual interpretation of actual ritual practice, and it is this 
ritual practice which, insofar as it attempts to influence the material conditions within which it takes 
place, intuits an oblique point of access to the generative force of being itself.  
 
Both thinkers thus emphasize the religious provenance of a rock art which “create[s] a sensible reality 
whereby the ordinary world is modified in response to the desire for the extraordinary.”93 Bataille 
contends that this desire is born from a traumatic recognition of the ubiquity of death,94 in response 
to which, art constitutes a generative, and hence transgressive, species of experimentation. The 
resultant cosmology – a world shaped by an inevitable confrontation with death – is significantly 
different from the cosmology which Lewis-Williams recognizes in much San rock art, and which is 
alluded to above. If both cosmic arrangements consist of multiple tiers – separating the material from 
the spiritual, the living from the dead, the human from the animal – the boundaries between these 
tiers are far more porous in San cosmology than in Bataille’s speculative history. By treating the 
separation of the sacred from the profane as a universal fact,95 Bataille reduces the role of ritual to 
one of transgression – the reversal of a prohibition – failing to acknowledge the many situations in 
which the distinction of the sacred from the profane is inapplicable. For all the subtleties of his 
                                                          
90 Ibid.; Bataille, Lascaux, 11. 
91 Ibid., 12. 
92 Ibid., 11. 
93 Ibid., 34. 
94 Lascaux, 29-30; see Smith, Against Ecological Sovereignty, 2-3, 9-10.  
95 Bataille, Lascaux, 30-1. Agamben’s writing on the sacred and the profane goes some way in demonstrating 
that Bataille’s views derive from Roman juridical norms, rather than from some universal prehistory (Giorgio 
Agamben, Profanations, trans. Jeff Fort (New York: Zone, 2007), 73-6.) The “special unavailability” (ibid., 73) 
which distinguishes the sacred is productively transgressed when “play frees and distracts humanity from the 
sphere of the sacred, without simply abolishing it” (ibid., 76), recalling Bataille’s claim that “art, play and 
transgression come not singly but every time joined in defiance” (Bataille, Lascaux, 38). 
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discussion, Smith seems to miss this possibility when he suggests that Lewis-Williams’ account 
“complicates but still supports Bataille’s interpretation.”96  
 
Returning to the Schaaplaats site, there are several groups of paintings which illustrate these 
cosmological and cosmopoetic subtleties with considerable force. Best preserved is a herd of Eland – 
the largest of the Southern African antelope, particularly closely associated with San ritual for their 
spiritual potency97 – and two central groups of therionthropes. Although some scholars favour the 
view that these are simply mimetic figures of hunters disguised in animal masks,98 a hermeneutic 
approach to San rock art insists that therionthropes be interpreted as icons of San cosmology and 
ritual practice –  as “people blended with animal who are experiencing trance”99 and which are “often 
painted...in an elongated fashion” or “bleeding [from the nose], staggering, lowering their heads, and 
with hair standing on end”100 to indicate the somatic symptoms of their transition between different 
levels of being, and the poetic conflux of immaterial and material experience.  
 
Although they are themselves interesting, the Schaaplaats therionthropes and eland are flanked by 
two, more enigmatic figures. Both offer considerable insight into the cosmology of the San, clarifying 
the generative force which moves through this work. For this is poetry in the precise sense described 
above: a struggle to grant form, to make, which is posited through a pattern against that which cannot 
be patterned – the void – in order to provide fugitive access to sense itself.  
 
The bright red and ochre figures to the far left of the shelter (Figure 2) mediate between the abstract 
and the concrete, moving between pattern qua pattern, and pattern as the preamble to a made thing, 
a form, a figure. While the ochre eland to the left of this group is unambiguous, the two forms to its 
right are deeply ambiguous. The intensity of the gestural lines which cross each other to constitute 
these forms suggests a biomorphic dynamism, but certainly not one as easily reducible as Woodhouse 
suggests, to a “canoe-like painting”101 adjacent to “a human figure [that] lies on its back with one arm 
outstretched”102 towards an object identified as a “paddle.”103  
                                                          
96 Smith, Against Ecological Sovereignty, 225. 
97 Lewis-Williams, “Constructing a Cosmos”, 41; David Morris, Sephai Mngqolo, Geoff Blundell, Anne Holliday 
and Thomas Dowson, “Dismantling a Powerful Place: The Salvaging of Rock Engravings Near Warrenton, 
Northern Cape,” Southern African Field Archaeology 4 (1995): 59. 
98 Bert Woodhouse, The rock art of the Golden Gate and Clarens districts (Rivonia: William Waterman, 2006), 58-
9. 
99 Lewis-Williams, Discovering, 50. 
100 Ibid., 53. 
101 Woodhouse, Rock art of Golden Gate, 59. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid.  
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Insisting on the mimetic aspect of rock art, threatens to miss its most forceful intuition of poiesis itself. 
While Woodhouse sees little reason to emphasize the “short strokes”104 of paint around the back of 
the eland, these are in fact inscriptions of the entoptic phenomena which the San assert are the most 
sure markers within the trance state of the vital potency from which all levels of existence draw their 
momentum.105 Perhaps not surprisingly, Bataille, makes a similar error with respect to the Lascaux 
site, mistaking entoptic patterns for “[c]learly gratuitous doodlings.”106 In fact, entoptic phenomena 
describe a broad range of neuropsychological experiences connected to visual hallucination, where an 
abstract pattern which does not have an external source is apparent when the eyes are both closed 
and open.107 In San rock art, the most common inscriptions of these phenomena include dots, circles, 
short lines, zig-zags and grids, surrounding forms and figures much as haloes might. The short strokes 
which emerge from the Schaaplaats ochre eland might, therefore, be understood as poetic 
inscriptions which seek to communicate the fact that form – the form of the eland, which is also the 
form of the poem – offers only a contingent means of stabilizing the poetic force which is always 
mediating between form and formlessness, and migrating between the different levels of existence.  
 
The attempt to transcribe, and in the process to interpret, these entoptic phenomena, sets as its aim 
nothing less than the mimesis of poiesis. Although no mimetic technique proves equal to this radical 
task, these entoptic marks nonetheless reveal a valuable species of marginalia – a poetic commentary 
on the forms they surround, as well as a reminder of the essential remoteness of poetic experience 
from the absolute absence from which it draws itself through the work of positing, patterning, or 
poiesis. Thus, entoptic marks seek to inscribe that which is constitutively absent in every presentation, 
and to offer an oblique but persistent hermeneutic of the void. Implicitly distinguishing between the 
poem and the void, entoptic patterning reaches toward the heart of poiesis, while carefully tracing 
itself around the absence of structure or pattern which is here termed the void.  
 
That poetry offers itself as an interpretation of radical absence, is closely reflected in attempts to 
represent the catenary curves – u- or boat-shaped – which are amongst the most pervasive entoptic 
phenomena. These have “a curved, flickering outside edge around a boat-shaped area of invisibility. 
The area of invisibility is a sort of ‘black hole’ which blots out anything in the ‘real’ world that it 
                                                          
104 Ibid. 
105 Lewis-Williams, Discovering, 46-8; Thomas Dowson, “Dots and Dashes: Cracking the Entoptic Code in 
Bushman Rock Paintings,” South African Archaeological Society Goodwin Series 6: 1989, 84, 91-3. 
106 Bataille, Lascaux, 35  
107 Ibid., 56-7. 
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happens to cover.”108 These are often the subject of a “fairly literal depiction,”109 both positive and 
negative. With respect to the former,110 the mark which Woodhouse identifies as a panga or paddle 
in the Schaaplaats red and ochre group, might as plausibly be interpreted as a red catenary curve. 
Indeed, it is possible that this entire group, the clearly formed eland aside, are non-mimetic, and 
represent attempts to transcribe entoptic phenomena as forms in positive space. Most u-shaped 
entoptics are represented by negative space, delineated by the marks or forms which emerge from a 
radical absence of form. As such, they constitute an empty “area of transformation”111 – the growing 
nothingness by which Nancy characterizes creation or poiesis – from which poetic forms are drawn,112 
“antelope legs and part-human, part-animal figures coming out of the area of invisibility.”113  
 
This essentially contentless event of poiesis, is exemplified with some force in the second of the more 
cryptic figures at Schaaplaats. To the far right of the shelter, from a fissure in the face of the rock, 
emerge two creatures (Figure 3). Like the poetic event to which they refer, these figures are fugitive. 
Not only has the intensity of their colours faded, but there is evidence of entoptic dashes, and also 
that these paintings have had numerous incarnations,114 as generations of shamanic poet-painters 
have traced their singular pattern over this point of contact with the void, painting figure upon figure, 
inscribing poem upon poem.115 Although difficult to discern with any precision, it is likely that the 
forms emerging from this fissure are rain creatures116 – the poetic expression of hallucinatory animals 
encountered in the trance-state, the power of which must be controlled in order to restrain the 
destructive power of the rain while harnessing its generative potential.117  
 
To the extent that it provides the source from which poiesis is transformed into pattern, the fissure 
represents a field of continuity between the material and the immaterial, and a poetic point of contact 
between sensation and sense. As approached by the poet, the fissure constitutes a singularly intense 
instantiation of the sublime: there is no way of telling how deep the fissure runs, or whether or not it 
is, in fact, an aperture to the void. In this sense, the fissure opens symbolically onto a fundamentally 
inaccessible field of sublime poetic potentiality: the growing nothing to which Nancy alludes, or that 
                                                          
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid., 57. 
110 See ibid., 59. 
111 Ibid., 57.  
112 See Lewis-Williams, Reality and Non-Reality, 7. 
113 Lewis-Williams, Discovering, 57.  
114 Woodhouse, Rock art of Golden Gate, 59.  
115 See Lewis-Williams, Discovering, 17. 
116 Woodhouse, Rock art of Golden Gate, 59.  
117 Lewis-Williams, Reality and Non-Reality, 15-7. 
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which Levinas’ terms the il y a or the there is – the “impersonal, anonymous, yet inextinguishable 
‘consummation’ of being, which murmurs in the depth of nothingness itself”118 – which, as Morton 
recognizes “enmeshes our being prior to any ontological notion such as ‘world’ or ‘system’.”119 
 
Entoptic phenomena share with fissures and cavities the difficult remoteness which reveals how sense 
is present in every poetic intuition, yet inaccessible in itself – an intuition which is reflected with 
remarkable clarity in Lyotard’s formulation of the sublime as “a sensory now...[which] cannot be 
presented and [yet] which remains to be presented.”120 Sublime poetic experience is thus marked by 
ekstasis – a movement from inside to outside exemplified in the emergence of forms from the 
Schaaplaats fissure, but also the externalization of an inwardness or privation through a sublime 
encounter which has a clearly external source,  as is the case with the pulsating glow of the sandstone 
cliffs at sunset. Ekstasis and remoteness coincide to the extent that they both describe the 
simultaneity of process and a state of externalization. In this light, it is possible to refine the central 
proposition of the present piece, that poiesis posits a pattern in relation to a radical and foundational 
remoteness of the poem from the void: poiesis is always involved in a paradoxical movement that is 
at once towards and away from the void. The void describes the absence proper to every situation of 
presence, and it is the void which marks the cultivation of nothingness from and against which sense  
draws its immanence. In this light, it becomes possible to say that the void indicates the intimacy of 
ekstasis – the inward-moving outwardness of sense – which marks the essence of every pattern or 
poem. 
 
 
6. Cosmopoetic compossibilities 
 
It is worth pausing on the similarity between technē – which Heidegger describes in terms of the 
capacity “to make something appear, within what is present”121 – and poiesis or “the thing made by 
making itself,”122 to recall Nancy. Their shared emphasis on generation helps to shed light on what is 
intended by patterning in the present argument: although technē involves a making not specifically 
tied to aesthetics in the manner of poiesis, poetry might nonetheless be described as the set of 
techniques by which poiesis is stabilized in terms of a pattern. Technique suggests a disposition, an 
                                                          
118 Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1978), 52.  
119 Morton, “Coexistence and Coexistents,” 172. 
120 Lyotard, “Sublime and the Avant-Garde,” 103. For a brief sketch of the stakes which connect the sublime, 
judgement, creation and world-making, see Nancy, Creation, 59.  
121 Martin Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” Poetry, Language, Thought, 159. 
122 Nancy, “Making Poetry,” 8. 
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availability towards some end. The disposition of the poem is towards sense, but since sense as such 
is unavailable, poetry is finally a disposition towards the technique which offers a brief point of contact 
with sense. The force which offers such contact is poiesis, but the technique which makes both poem 
and poiesis intelligible in terms of pattern and patterning, is termed poetics. Poetics is thus the 
technique by which a pattern is made of patterning.123 As a technique, poetics reflects a disposition, 
but it is a disposition towards that which cannot be consistently presented – sense and the void – and 
so which discovers no telos. Here is a precise echo of Kant’s understanding of aesthetic judgement in 
terms of a “purposiveness without purpose, insofar as we do not posit the causes of this form in a will 
and yet can grasp the explanation of its possibility only by deriving it from a will.”124  
 
Poetic patterning derives, in the first place, from the void as a necessary rather than a voluntary 
condition to the presentation of sense, yet poetry can finally only be interpreted, if it is interpreted as 
something which is patterned with some sort of direction. It is in this precise sense that the poem 
announces a cosmopoetics – the production of a contingently coherent pattern capable of reflecting 
the ateleological understanding of a cosmos constituted of multiplicity.125  The poem reveals “sense 
as a being-to”126 – a movement towards, an approach without arrival which, recalling the coincidence 
of poetic remoteness and ekstasis, is “another way of being outside of oneself, of being to oneself as 
though sent, thrown, or dispatched, not having arrived, still coming.”127 Hence poetry cannot make 
unambiguous sense. As Agamben recognizes, the poem “suspend[s] its own end,”128 since “the end 
would imply a poetic impossibility,”129 namely, the absolute coincidence of sensible information with 
the sense of being.130  This would miss that the dual vocation of the poem which establishes sense 
both as telos – “[s]ense as...terminus and as destination,”131 and as ground – “sense as principle or 
origin.”132 This region of ambiguity is precisely located at the point at which the figures emerge from 
the fissure at Schaaplaats. To exit the void is also indirectly to locate it: the poem becomes sensible 
                                                          
123 The proximity of three formulations central to the present work – of the cosmos as a world created of 
creating, of the poem as a thing made of making, and of poetics as the discernment of a pattern made of 
patterning – suggest how poetics is able to demonstrates the co-extensiveness of poiesis and world-making as 
forces generative of a cosmos.    
124 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1987), 
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only at the point of multivalent contact with the void, the point at which the poem is subtracted from 
pure sense itself.  
 
It is the multivalency of this point – reflecting in poetic becoming both telos and origin – which 
connects the patterning of the poem to the patterning of the world. The reconnection of poem and 
world recalls the type of processual ontology which Heidegger refers to as the “worlding of the 
world.”133 The “worlding world”134 describes the self-generative process by which the world comes 
into being as radical immanence. For Heidegger, worlding can be grasped neither in terms of ground 
and cause, nor in terms of telos and end.135 Like poiesis, worlding is an orientation towards telos and 
origin which can only be conceptualized in the necessarily unstable terms of an immanent 
becoming.136 For Heidegger the orientation or comportment of poetry is finally a return to aletheia – 
an uncovering of existential essences137 on which basis he famously claims that “[a]ll art, as the letting 
happen of advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, essentially poetry.”138  
 
Recalling the earlier distinction of oikos, geos and cosmos, it is possible to recognize more clearly now 
why Heidegger’s ideas regarding worlding habitually lead to the conviction that poetry conveys a sense 
of dwelling, referring to the manner in which something “initiates [its] own nature”139 in a return to 
its essence. The poem, for Heidegger, is a sort of homecoming, or a return to the oikos or dwelling of 
being. This understanding of oikos serves as the root for a type of deep ecology140 identified with 
Heidegger’s thought, and informs a species of ecopoetics which, ranging across a spectrum of themes, 
forms and images, identifies in the worlding of the poem, a “nearing of nearness”141 – a de-distancing 
which, in Wilson’s terms, might translate with relative ease into “an active and vigilant critical as well 
as poetic constructivist process.”142 
                                                          
133 Heidegger, “The Thing,” 180.   
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136 Processual becoming is described by numerous other Heidegerrian terms in addition to worlding, including 
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disentangle itself. 
141 Heidegger, “The Thing,” 180. 
142 Rob Wilson, “Afterword: Worlding as Future Tactic,” The Worlding Project: Doing Cultural Studies in the Era 
of Globalization, ed. Rob Wilson and Christopher Leigh Connery (Santa Cruz: New Pacific Press, 2007), 212. 
22 
 
 
However, it is necessary to distinguish worlding – a universal process of becoming – from world-
making, which involves the generation of a particular configuration of objects and events within this 
situation of becoming.  The poem might be described, in this light, as a singular instance of world-
making which exemplifies the immersion of being within worlding. Heidegger’s interlocutors143 are 
habitually divided on whether the poem actually has its telos and origin in aletheia and presence, or 
in the void and absence. The former easily extends to a vision of poetry as having an intrinsically 
ecopoetic disposition – a poetic or generative movement towards oikos or dwelling; an approach, a 
closing of distance, and a nearing. By contrast, judging the void as the telos and origin of the poem 
recognizes that it is remoteness, rather than dwelling, which characterizes poiesis. Rigby, for example, 
favours a “negative ecopoetics”144 in which the poem demonstrates the “nonequation of word and 
thing, poem and place” in which case the force of the poem resides not in what is unconcealed, but in 
remoteness itself, in “the withholding of what is promised.”145 Remoteness is the recognition that 
every poetic pattern is recognizable as such only because it is patterned against the absolute negation 
of the void. In this sense, remoteness is the marker of a radical contingency, and a sublime echo of 
the contingency of all existence.146  
 
Three models of poetic patterning are presented above. First, in the transfigurative encounter with 
the sunset, the pattern is derived from an essentially external source at the intersection of sensation 
and physical phenomena entirely indifferent to sensory perception. Second, the poetic pattern is 
derived from an internal encounter between sense and sensation, which seems to be the case with 
the attempt to transcribe entoptic phenomena which we encounter at the far left of the Schaaplaats 
site. The third explanation of poetic patterning emphasizes poiesis as a force of ambiguous emergence 
from the void, which is charged with significance precisely because the void cannot be patterned, and 
which is suggested by the fugitive figures which proceed from the fissure to the right of the shelter. 
However, understanding poiesis is not a question of choosing between competing explanations of 
poetic patterning. What is central, instead, is the compossibility of internally – and externally derived 
patterning with more ambiguous and complex emergent patterns. Such compossibility – within which 
                                                          
143 Amongst these interlocutors most relevant to the present work, we might note the philosophers Levinas, 
Bataille, Agamben and Nancy, and the critics and theorists Bate, Rigby, Wilson and Morton. 
144 Rigby, “Earth, World, Text,” 437. 
145 Ibid.  
146 See Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier (London 
and New York: Continuum, 2008), 65. 
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apparent contradictories are demonstrably able to co-exist without eliminating their distinctiveness147 
– necessitates reformulating the oikos of ecopoetics in terms of the cosmos of cosmopoetics.  
 
Much as Nancy recognizes that the world grows ex nihilo, so the present argument is that the void 
constitutes the ground for compossibility, recalling that compossibility is precisely what distinguishes 
the diversity of the cosmos from that which the notion of oikos suggests is ultimately a question of 
confluence. It is the void, after all, that is common to every possible structure, and so, too, to every 
compossible structure. In this light, while ecopoetics represents the confluence of divergent paths 
towards an oikos or dwelling, cosmopoetics envisions the situation in which the paths of a number of 
proximal events “extend in all directions,”148 an extensionality which is unimaginable without the void 
as ground for a region of compossibility.  
 
Cosmopoetics places in radical doubt the adequacy of Heidegger’s anthropocentrism to the task of 
understanding world-making or poiesis. Heidegger restricts world-making and the consequent 
capacity to dwell in this world, to human agents: humans form a world in which to dwell, animals 
merely occupy a world, while material objects, while existing in a world, are themselves fundamentally 
worldless.149 While poetry is certainly a species of world-making, generatively mediating between 
sense and sensation, it is equally true that the world conditions the possibility of the poem precisely 
to the extent that existence – the world itself – depends on maintaining a measured but generative 
relationship with the void. The poem is one of these measures: inasmuch as it offers a brief point of 
contact with the void, the significance of this contact might as easily be understood by its corollary – 
that the poem only closes in order to restore a necessary distance, or the constitutive remoteness of 
the void.  
 
 
7. Remoteness 
 
That the contemporary sense of cosmos as the totality of existence continues to move steadily away 
from an implicitly geo- and anthropocentric view of an ordered existence, is reflected in the shift from 
                                                          
147 See Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia UP, 1990), 
171-2; Alain Badiou, Conditions, trans. Steven Corcoran (London and New York: Continuum, 2008), 23; Norman 
Madarasz, “Introduction,” Manifesto for Philosophy, Alain Badiou, trans. Norman Madarasz (Albany: State U of 
New York P, 1999), 19-20. 
148 Deleuze, Logic, 172.  
149 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William 
McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1995), 177-8. 
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an ecopoetics to a cosmopoetics. Defined above as the poetic patterning of the world qua cosmos, a 
cosmopoetics takes up the challenge of evading that to which Rigby seems resigned in reporting the 
apparent “inescapability of weak anthropocentrism.”150 Cosmopoetics refers to something more than 
a “merely human response…to the call of nature’s self-disclosure, it autopoiesis”151 precisely to the 
extent that poiesis describes a force that moves, unbounded, across all tiers of existence. Poiesis is 
able to be patterned, to become a poem, soley because, drawn from and against the void, it is radically 
remote, radically indifferent, to those situations it animates.  
 
Cosmopoetics, to the extent that it patterns itself against the void, expresses itself as a poetic of 
remoteness. An unexpected symmetry becomes evident between the type of remoteness which is 
reflected by the topological singularity of the sublime evanescence of the Rooiberg sunset, and the 
remoteness evident in the poetic absence marked by the fissure at Schaaplaats which symbolizes the 
void, and from and against which pattern and form are drawn. These demonstrate how remoteness 
describes a conceptual threshold between presence and absence, the same threshold upon which the 
sense of the world is at once immanent and yet unavailable. 
 
However, it is necessary to keep in mind that if remoteness is an absolute condition of the void, it is 
relative in any specific judgement. Thus, if the Schaaplaats site and its geography speak in an 
exemplary manner of the remoteness at the heart of poetry itself, and the relation of this remoteness 
to the sense of being, they do not speak without a specific intonation.152  Resisting the dominant stress 
in western discourse on narratives derived from an apparently stable centre – a located, historical 
corpus – the narrativization of San culture remains unavoidably caught in a web of ideological 
sequences which fluctuate between a bucolic idealization, and a blatant trivialization. San poetics is 
all too easily forced to the periphery, regarded as a marginal discourse of a migratory people, the 
remainder153 which lacks valency or traction. Such misprision necessitates both a hermeneutic and a 
poetic of San art, the former establishing an interpretive lexicon, the latter an account of poetic origin 
and effect. These seek to challenge the predominance of aesthetic and mimetic reductions of this art, 
restoring a sense of its poetic force – a force which is habitually rendered remote from the reality it 
plays no small part in constituting.  
 
                                                          
150 Rigby, “Earth, World, Text,” 438. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Indeed, Nancy talks about a “tonics” of sense (Nancy, The Necessity of Sense, 114). 
153 See note 5 above. 
25 
 
 Yet, as Heidegger remarks, “[w]hat is least remote for us in point of distance...can remain far from 
us...[while w]hat is incalculably far from us in point of distance can be near to us.”154 Careful 
examination suggests that the imposition of conceptual centres in relation to which information is 
organized, is itself the result of an elision of physical distance and the temporal distribution of events. 
This conflation provides the basis from which judgements regarding relative nearness or remoteness 
can be determined by a quintessentially hierarchical arrangement which so often seems to have its 
centre projected from a location other than the one to which it is applied – a mythical centre of power 
and authority from which relative value is determined. The question of remoteness is eminently 
political, weighed against the notion of proximity and the localization and exercise of political power. 
The reduction of remoteness to a question of distance and proximity brings with it the sphere of 
normative judgements regarding belonging and non-belonging, so that the proximity of the centre 
also becomes a point of desire, while the periphery is to be eschewed.  
 
The present work has sought to move decisively beyond this limited conception of remoteness as a 
relative measure. It argues instead that remoteness is a necessary condition for the emergence of 
poetry in both its structural and generative aspects, since the poem is drawn from and against the 
void – which is the necessary condition of structure itself. The remoteness exemplified at Schaaplaats 
cannot be reduced to a question of geographical remoteness – this would depend on the erroneous 
identification of a centre, or oikos, from which proximity and distance are measured – nor is its 
remoteness a question of history, style, rhetoric, or form as such. Rather, remoteness conditions the 
manner in which poiesis mediates between the poem – an exemplar of pattern and structure – and 
the void – the absence of pattern, structure, and form.  As Nancy recognizes, in poetry, “[t]he selfsame 
thing that is both abolished and posited is the access to sense. Access is unmade as passage, process, 
aim, and path, as approach and approximation.”155 Remoteness is thus construed as constitutive with 
respect to a poetic access to sense – a constructive distance between poem and void which is bridged 
only briefly, and only intermittently, by the force of poiesis.  
 
The unpredictable urgency of poetic events is clarified in Gibson’s assertion that “intermittently the 
possibility of value interrupts a world without value.”156  The brief point of contact with the void which 
poiesis affords, constitutes precisely such an interruption. Poetry indicates remoteness as a mark of 
its poetic work, even its most intimate moments, since it offers an oblique presentation of the 
                                                          
154 Heidegger, “The Thing,” 165. 
155 Nancy, “Making Poetry,” 8. 
156 Gibson, Intermittency, 26. 
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structuring force of the void which cannot be directly presented,157 yet which is always working 
through the poem in the dialectic terms of production and negation.158 In this sense, remoteness is 
the condition of the poem’s materialization qua poem, the crystallization of a fragile form which, 
“properly identical with itself, whether we are dealing with a piece of writing or a natural object,”159 
constitutes an infinite echo of a lost essence. This essence, were it to manifest, would be an absolute 
poiesis – a positing of something out of nothing, of the poem ex nihilo, a quasi-divine gesture which 
would negate the void itself. It is precisely this gesture to which Nancy is opposed in insisting that the 
ex nihilo does not mean fabricated with nothing by a particularly ingenious producer.”160 Instead, 
poiesis describes a radically generative force precisely to the extent that it is emerges simultaneously 
from and against the void. It is this relational dynamic – of being from as well as against – which marks 
the poetics of remoteness. To instantiate being itself – to make something out of nothing – is perhaps 
the ultimate goal of both poem and poet, but it is one which remains irretrievably remote, and it is 
intensifying our apprehension of this remoteness which makes poetry invaluable still. 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                          
157 Badiou, Being and Event, 93-5. 
158 Nancy, “Making Poetry,” 4, 8-9. 
159 Ibid., 3. 
160 Nancy, Creation, 51. 
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